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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels issued an executive order in January 2005 directing 
Indiana health and medical professionals to report adverse event data to the Indiana State 
Department of Health (Indiana State Medical Association, 2007). The Indiana State Department 
of Health (ISDH) subsequently commissioned the Regenstrief Center for Healthcare Engineering 
at Purdue University to gather information that would inform the long term strategy for reporting 
the data received from Indiana health and medical providers. 
The purpose of this report is to identify how Indiana news media professionals and 
Indiana health and medical professionals perceive adverse events and the regulation requiring 
health and medical professionals to report medical adverse events data to the state. To 
accomplish this goal, Purdue University researchers conducted an email survey targeting Indiana 
news media professionals and focus groups with Indiana health and medical professionals. 
Specifically, the goals of this project were to 1) identify barriers to the medical adverse events 
regulation and to identify solutions to those barriers, 2) to better understand how the data should 
be communicated to the public in order to improve patient safety, and 3) to identify the Indiana 
news media’s perceptions of medical adverse events.  
Focus group data were collected from health and medical professionals across Indiana. 
Responses revealed a range of understanding and misunderstanding of the concepts medical 
errors and adverse events, as well as the reporting system in general. Moreover, themes across 
groups included anxiety toward the public reporting of medical adverse events, the perception 
that the system is punitive, and an almost universal agreement regarding the potential for the 
system to educate health care providers and leaders about errors and near misses. The research 
was supplemented by an email survey to gauge the understanding of medical adverse events by 
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Indiana’s news media. Results indicate that the news media recognize the complexity of medical 
adverse events, but believe the data should be made available for the public to prevent future 
medical adverse events. The data reveal that the ISDH will play a key role in the success of the 
reporting system. A host of communication strategies need to be implemented by the ISDH to 
maximize the positive impact of these mandatory reported data, and to ensure that health 
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In January 2005, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels issued an executive order directing 
Indiana health and medical professionals to report adverse event data to the Indiana State 
Department of Health (ISDH) (Indiana State Medical Association, 2007). As of 2006, the 
National Academy for State Health Policy listed 27 states that have implemented medical 
adverse events reporting procedures. 1 In January 2006, Indiana health and medical professionals 
began reporting 27 different types of serious preventable medical adverse events to the ISDH. 2 
A preliminary report was released on March 6, 2007.     
The reporting of adverse events is a complicated issue involving multiple stakeholders, 
including patients, health and medical professionals and the news media. If handled correctly, 
medical adverse events reporting has the potential promote open sharing of best practices and 
strategies for avoiding adverse events. Yet there is also potential for confusion, fear, and/or 
blame if reporting results are misinterpreted or misused. To maximize the positive use of 
Indiana’s reporting system, the ISDH commissioned the Regenstrief Center for Healthcare 
Engineering at Purdue University in April 2006 to conduct research that would aid in 
understanding how Indiana health, medical, and news media professionals perceive medical 
adverse events and the state’s mandatory reporting regulation. Specifically, the goals of this 
project were to 1) identify barriers to the medical adverse events regulation and to identify 
solutions to those barriers, 2) to better understand how the data should be communicated to the 
public in order to improve patient safety, and 3) to identify the Indiana news media’s perceptions 





Prevalence of Adverse Events 
Medical adverse events are the eighth leading cause of death in the United States, 
(National Institute of Medicine, 1999). Estimates of the number of people who die in hospitals 
each year as the results of adverse events range from 44,000 to 98,000; this is compared to 
deaths from motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42,297), and AIDS (16,516). The 
frequency of adverse events is also recognized among patients with 42% of Americans reporting 
that they had personal knowledge of an adverse event in their own care, or in the care of a 
relative or friend (Start et al., 2002). Beyond fatality and injury figures, costs associated with 
adverse events are equally alarming. Total national costs (lost income, lost household 
production, disability, and health care costs) of preventable adverse events (medical adverse 
events resulting in injury) are estimated to be between $17 billion and $29 billion (AHRQ, 
2000).  
 
History of Adverse Event Reporting 
The first published report of medical adverse events dates back to 1976, when a 
physician-attorney named Don Harper Mills analyzed more than 20,000 medical charts 
concluding that one patient in 20 was harmed by treatment (Mills, 1976). Further research 
describing the problem emerged in subsequent years and was largely sponsored by the Agency 
for Health Care Policy and Research, which is now the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ, 2000). Analysis at the federal level concluded that medical adverse events were 
one of the four major challenges to improving health care quality in the United States, and 
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resulted in the development of a Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC) to 
coordinate quality improvement activities in federal health care programs. 3  
Developments in medical adverse events reporting were largely ignored until the 1999 
publication of To Err is Human, a widely-disseminated indictment of the prevalence of medical 
adverse events in US health care by the Institute of Medicine (IoM).  While the 287-page report 
contained no new research (Marchey, 2003), the IoM’s freedom from direct government control 
gave the report a fresh relevance. Since the release of the IoM report, many states have 
voluntarily implemented medical adverse events reporting systems. As of December 2006, 27 
states have passed legislation, regulation, or executive orders related to hospital reporting of 
adverse events (National Academy for State Health Policy, 2006).  
 
The Labeling Issue 
Although mandatory reporting systems are in place, controversy exists regarding the 
labeling of medical occurrences that cause or have the potential to cause harm, injury or death to 
patients. For instance, The Institute of Medicine (1999) defines a “medical error” as the failure of 
a planned action to be completed as intended, or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.  The 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2000) similarly defines “adverse event” as an 
injury or death resulting from a medical intervention, something that is not due to the underlying 
condition of the patient (AHRQ, 2000). In addition, the Joint Commission uses the term “sentinel 
event” to describe any unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or 
psychological injury, or risk thereof.   
The proliferation of terms has caused controversy in health care; some medical and health 
professionals consider the term medical error as misleading because they claim that it is vague 
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and sensational (Schwitzer, Mudur, Henry, Wilson, Goozner, 2005). Most people believe that 
“medical errors” usually involve drugs, such as a patient getting the wrong prescription or 
dosage, or a mishandled surgery, such as amputation of the wrong limb (IoM, 1999). In contrast, 
the term “adverse event” seems to be more inclusive, including any preventable patient injury or 
death. This more inclusive term is the focus of Indiana’s new regulation. Specifically, the state 
mandates the reporting of preventable adverse events - an adverse event attributable to error 
(IoM, 1999).  For example, if a patient dies from pneumonia obtained postoperatively, it is an 
adverse event (i.e., a serious injury or death resulting from medical management, not the 
underlying condition of the patient). If analysis reveals that the patient got pneumonia because of 
poor hand washing or by instrument cleaning techniques by the staff, the adverse event was 
preventable (attributable to an error of execution).  
Preventable adverse events reflect two types of failure; either the correct action does not 
proceed as intended (an error of execution) or the original intended action is not correct (an error 
of planning).  They can be diagnostic (e.g., misdiagnosis leading to an incorrect choice of 
therapy, misinterpretation of test results), equipment-related (e.g., defibrillators with dead 
batteries or intravenous pumps whose valves are easily dislodged or bumped), infection-related 
(e.g., post-surgical wound infections), transfusion-related (e.g., giving a patient the incorrect type 
of blood) or 5) misinterpretation of medical orders (e.g., failing to give a patient a salt-free meal, 
as ordered by a physician) (AHRQ, 2000).  
 
Benefits of Reporting 
 
Controversy aside, the Institute of Medicine (1999) reports several benefits to mandatory 
systems of reporting medical adverse events.  
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1. Mandatory reporting systems can be used to hold health care facilities accountable for 
safety. Implementation of such systems can protect the public by assuring that errors are 
reported. This, in return, encourages more investment by providers to improve patient safety.  
2. Mandatory reporting systems can help identify system weaknesses. Documentation of 
single adverse events may highlight overall system weaknesses. Some reporting proponents have 
argued that state government should be aware of serious preventable adverse events that occur 
within health care facilities because single incidents may indicate that facility error prevention 
mechanisms are not working effectively. Identification of system weaknesses is what report 
leaders state as the first step in driving improvements toward patient safety. 
3. Mandatory reporting systems can complement other oversight functions. Although 
states are legally responsible for hospital licensure, the influence of federal oversight activity can 
create an environment in which straight oversight can be been minimized. Most states have 
yielded considerable regulatory oversight to the Joint Commission by participating in 
accreditation surveys as full or partial compliance with state insurance requirements in order to 
minimize duplication and expenses for both states and facilities. However, the US Office of 
Inspector General has argued that the accreditation process will unlikely detect substandard 
patterns of care.  
4. The public expects state governments to provide oversight of health care facilities. 
Mandatory reporting systems may help states address consumer expectations. According to a 
national survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, almost three-quarters of those surveyed believe the government should 
require health care providers to report all serious medical adverse events because some states 
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have been embarrassed to learn about adverse incidents through the news media rather than 
through regulatory oversight (AHRQ, 2000). 
5. Information collected through mandatory reporting systems can complement other 
state functions. State purchasers can use mandatory reporting system data to develop purchasing 
strategies which emphasize the quality of care.  
6. Mandatory reporting systems create an important check and balance. Although 
mandatory reporting systems will not eliminate medical adverse events, they can create a critical 
system of checks and balances to assure that a facility’s  internal patient safety activities are 
working. Without public oversight, there is no mechanism to ensure that patient safety initiatives 
are effective. Some mandatory reporting advocates argue that the very existence of reporting 
systems provides an incentive for facilities to improve patient safety (Rosenthal & Riley, 2001).  
These IoM (1999) recommendations and continued deliberations were followed up with 
the National Quality Forum (NQF) listing of medical adverse events that should be reported. The 
NQF is a non-profit membership organization created to develop and implement a national 
strategy for health care quality measurement and reporting (NQF, 2006). The NQF Serious 
Reportable Events in Healthcare (2002) was meant to establish agreement of a set of serious 
preventable adverse events that might form the basis for a national, state-based event reporting 
system. The primary reason for identifying a standardized set of serious reportable events on a 
mandatory basis was to facilitate public accountability. The NQF report lists 27 types of major 
events (see Endnote 2). Several specific events are included within several categories including 
surgical events (e.g., surgery performed on the wrong body part), product or device events (e.g., 
patient death or injury associated with the use of contaminated drugs or devices), patient 
protection events (e.g., infant discharged to the wrong person), care management events 
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(maternal death or serious disability associated with labor or delivery in a low-risk pregnancy 
while being cared for in a healthcare facility), environmental events (e.g., patient death or serious 
disability associated with an electric shock while being cared for in a healthcare facility), and 
criminal events (e.g., abduction of a patient of any age).  
 
Perceptions about Reporting 
Some medical leaders question the need and effectiveness of a mandatory reporting 
system, because they feel they have built a culture of openness where medical and health 
professionals do not feel hesitant about reporting medical adverse events. These leaders are 
concerned that the public reporting of errors will create a culture of fear, lessening the likelihood 
that these errors will be reported. They say just providing a list of errors creates a spotlight on the 
wrongdoing of professionals, rather than the prevention of future medical adverse events.  
However, many other medical professionals say that the reporting system is a positive 
force because medical professionals can learn corrective and preventative procedures through 
sharing information openly among medical institutions. And patients also advocate open 
reporting, particularly when an event involves their care or the care of a loved one. According to 
Berry and Knapp (2003), patients desire comprehensive information about their options so they 
can participate in decisions about their health care. In one study, patients were unanimous in 
their desire to be told about any error that caused harm, although not all would want to know 
about errors that did not cause them harm (Mazor, Simon, & Gurwitz, 2004). This attitude 
mirrors a more general trend with patients becoming more active consumers of health 
information as opposed to more passive recipients of information and health care alike  
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A national survey by the same authors found that 89 percent of the public believed 
physicians should be required to tell patients when errors are made in their care. The authors 
reported that in a smaller study of emergency department patients, 76 percent would want to be 
informed immediately if something went wrong in their care, and 88 percent favored full 
disclosure (Mazor, Simon, & Gurwitz, 2004). In another study, 80 percent of patients indicated 
that they would want to discuss an error of little or no harm with another physician. Fewer than 
10 percent reported that they would want financial compensation following an error without 
harm, but this number increased to approximately 20 percent following a moderate error and to 
nearly 60 percent following a severe error (Witman, Park, & Hardin, 1996). 
Physicians in the United States tend to agree with patients about the importance of 
disclosure.  In a recent survey, 77 percent of the surveyed physicians felt that physicians should 
be required to tell patients when errors are made in their care (Blendon, DesRoches, & Brodie, 
2002). In the instance of a prescribing error resulting in death, 90 percent of physicians believed 
that the prescribing physician should disclose the error; fewer thought that the nurse involved (70 
percent) or the hospital (71 percent) should disclose. In response to the same error resulting in an 
injury but with full recovery, 85 percent believed that the physician should disclose, while 75 
percent thought that the nurse should disclose and 60 percent believed that the hospital should 
disclose.   
Yet it appears that physician support for full disclosure does not necessarily represent 
their most common response when an error occurs. When physician trainees were queried about 
their most significant medical mistake made in the last year, 24 percent reported discussing the 
error with the patient or family; a similar rate (21 percent) was found in a later study of 
physicians (Mazor, Simon, & Gurwitz, 2004). And according to a study by Gallagher, 
 13
Waterman, Ebers, Fraser & Levinson (2003), physicians noted that there was no need to disclose 
if the harm was trivial or if the patient was unaware of the error. 
Health care providers often list fear of litigation as significant reason for not disclosing 
medical adverse events. Yet a survey showed that of family members involved in malpractice 
claims alleging perinatal injury, 20 percent indicated they were seeking information, and only 24 
percent indicated they sought legal action when they perceived that there had been a cover-up or 
the physician had failed to be completely honest, had allowed them to believe things that were 
not true, or had intentionally misled them. A study of malpractice plaintiffs’ depositions 
identified physician-patient relationship issues in 71 percent of the depositions. Although it is not 
clear whether issues with the physicians existed before the adverse outcomes, 32 percent of the 
depositions referred to physician desertion or failure to be available, 26 percent referred to 
dysfunctional delivery of information, and 13 percent referred to failure to solicit or hear 
patients’ requests for information, opinions, or expressions of discomfort (Beckman, Markakis, 
Suchman, & Frankel, 1994). Of those pursuing medical negligence claims, 91 percent of 
respondents reported that desire for an explanation was a reason for their pursuing legal action 
(Vincent, Young, & Phillips, 1994).  
Health care professionals may also fear how an adverse event might be framed by news 
media.  Media reports, like those that surfaced following the release of To Err is Human (IoM, 
1999), tended to highlight shocking statistics and pin the blame on individuals, rather than 
scrutinizing loopholes in the system (Jackson, 2001). Media misjudgments lead the public to 
draw false or simplistic conclusions about a multifaceted problem (Dentzer, 2000).  
The Institute of Medicine has also been critical of the way that media has framed medical 
adverse events, noting that several media outlets, including The New York Times and The 
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Washington Post, have reported only the upper end of death figures attributable adverse events – 
98,000.  Only a handful of news stories clarified that estimates were based on extrapolations 
from the Colorado-Utah and New York studies, at least one of which was 15 years-old (Dentzer, 
2000). 
The literature reviewed above suggests that the issue of medical adverse events is a 
delicate one. Although physicians report the necessity to disclose at a similar rate as patients, this 
belief is not always manifest into action. Similarly, although patients desire certain information 
that would be afforded by the reporting of medical adverse events, media may not provide the 
information in a way that is most useful to the patient or most desired by physicians or other 
health care leaders. The Indiana adverse events regulation takes the discussion of errors beyond 
the individual physician-patient relationship to a widespread audience.  Most relevant to the 
present report, news media will play a key role in affecting how citizens understand and use this 
information to meet their health and medical needs.  
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this report is to understand how Indiana health, medical and news media 
professionals perceive medical adverse events and the mandatory reporting regulation.  
Specifically, the project aimed to  1) identify barriers to reporting and solutions to those barriers, 
2) determine how data is best communicated to the public in order to improve patient safety, and 
3) understand how the news media in Indiana views adverse events.    
Several research questions were addressed via focus groups with Indiana health and 
medical professionals. It is important to understand the perceptions of this constituent audience 
to determine which communication strategies would be optimal.   
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Research Question 1: What are Indiana medical and health professionals’ perceptions of 
the medical error/adverse event reporting system? 
Research Question 2: What do Indiana medical and health professionals believe should be 
done with the medical error/adverse event data?  
A third question was posed to address the barriers that might limit the effectiveness of the 
reporting system. To the extent that barriers can be identified prior to policy implementation, 
more accurate information can be garnered from reporting organizations.  
Research Question 3: What barriers do Indiana medical and health professionals perceive 
will affect the reporting of medical errors/adverse events to the state of Indiana? 
Research Question 4: What are perceived solutions to those barriers by Indiana medical 
and health professionals?    
 It is important to understand media perceptions in order to learn how to best 
communicate the data to them. Several research questions were addressed via an email survey to 
all Indiana media professionals. First, given the news media’s interpretation of medical adverse 
events will affect how they frame the issue for the public:  
Research Question 5: What is Indiana news media professionals understanding of medical 
adverse events? 
 It is also important to identify the perceived causes of medical adverse events by Indiana 
news media professionals in order to educate them on actual causes. Some news media 
professionals may feel responsible to identify a concrete explanation behind the error when 
consumers’ lives are at risk. 
Research Question 6: What do Indiana news media professionals perceive as the possible 
causes of medical errors/adverse events? 
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Research has shown that system improvements can reduce the error rates and improve the 
quality of health care. For example, including a pharmacist on medical rounds reduced the errors 
related to medication ordering by 66 percent, from 10.4 per 1,000 patient days to 3.5 per 1,000 
patient days (IoM, 1999). Using standardized guidelines, protocols and equipment, wireless 
computer technology and bar-coding have cut overall hospital medication error rates by 70 
percent in one Department of Veterans Affairs hospital. Solutions do exist, and it is important to 
identify what the public, including the news media, perceive as the answer to alleviating the 
number of medical adverse events that occur.  
Research Question 7: What do Indiana news media professionals perceive as the solution to 
medical errors /adverse events? 
 
IV. METHODS 
Researchers employed focus groups to understand medical and health providers’ 
perceptions of the medical adverse event reporting regulation, and email surveys targeting 
Indiana news journalists to gauge their perceptions.   
 
Health and Medical Provider Focus Groups 
Due to the descriptive nature of this research, focus groups were employed as the initial 
form of data collection. The focus group method is an effective approach in understanding how 
people think and feel about an issue, and to identify lay beliefs that exist among Indiana health 




Participants and Procedures 
 A total of 32 adult health and/or medical providers participated in one of five focus 
groups, with three to 11 participants per group. Subjects were recruited through the Indiana 
Hospital & Health Association. Participants included nurses, quality professionals, hospital 
executives (e.g., chief executive officers, chief medical officers, chief operating officers), 
physicians, and public relations and marketing professionals. Work experience among 
participants in their current positions ranged from six months to 36 years, and they held degrees 
including BA/BS, MA/MS, RN, PhD, and MD. Informed consent was obtained from 
participants, and focus groups were audio-taped for transcription purposes. A February snow 
storm affected the attendance of one focus group. Due to the difficulty of rescheduling focus 
groups, participants unable to attend a focus group received the questions by phone or email.   
Moderator Training and Guide 
 Two females and three males conducted the focus groups. Derived from the literature 
review on medical adverse events perceptions, moderator guide questions were arranged into six 
main topic areas: 1) introduction, 2) perceptions of medical adverse events and the adverse 
events regulation, 3) overall impact, 4) communication of data, 5) barriers to adverse events 
reporting, and 6) solutions to barriers. Researchers solicited input from the ISDH on questions 
and approval of the final moderator guide.  
Data Analysis 
 The content of the focus groups was transcribed verbatim. Data were analyzed by two 
coders and the coding scheme was cross-checked by inductive analysis where research begins 
with the data (Shoemaker, Tankard, & Lasorsa, 2004). Data were coded and categorized into six 
overall categories based on open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Charmaz, 2006). 
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Initial data analysis involved open coding to identify discrete themes. These themes were 
compared and grouped within broader categories. 
 
Indiana News Media Email Survey 
 Email surveys were chosen to collect data from news media due to their convenience and 
affordability (Dillman, 2007). An email survey was sent to one representative of each Indiana 
news media organization, including radio, television, daily and weekly newspaper publications. 
Questionnaires were sent to 68 daily and 96 paid weekly Indiana newspapers (2006 Editor & 
Publisher International Yearbook). A total of fourteen television news stations from five major 
markets (i.e., Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, Terre Haute, Evansville, and South Bend) received the 
questionnaire, based on the Nielson Media’s television market list. Few radio stations focus on 
news as their primary product; thus, only one radio news station in Indiana was invited to 
participate in the email survey.   
The survey targeted people who covered health news; however, most Indiana news 
organizations do not employ health/medical beat reporters, rather they employ general 
assignment reporters who cover a wide array of topics including health or medical issues. If the 
news organization did not employ a health/medical beat reporter, the email survey was addressed 
to a newsroom editor or director.  
Participants 
 Collectively, Indiana news media respondents were reflective of people who work in a 
typical newsroom (Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2007). Most were Caucasian 
(92%), have a college degree (52%) or at least some college (26%), and have an annual 
household income of less than $50,000 (40%) or between $50,000 and $74,999 (14%). The 
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majority of respondents worked as editors (50%), news directors (12%), non-health/medical beat 
reporters (16%), or health/medical-beat reporters (14%). Most news employees rated their 
understanding of health or medical issues as good (54%) or fair (40%), and they felt somewhat 
confident (84%) about covering heath issues. The number of female (52%) and male (48%) 
respondents were nearly equal.   
Procedures 
 The email survey took place from November 17, 2006 to February 17, 2007. Completed 
questionnaires were received from 52 participants out of 179 Indiana news organizations, a 
response rate of 29 percent. For email surveys, attaining a high response rate can be difficult, 
especially from people who work at a news organization (Dillman, 2007). The highest returns 
were from smaller circulation newspapers; 94 percent of respondents from newspapers with a 
circulation size of 100,000 or less completed the survey.  
Survey Instrument 
 The email questionnaire was revised several times based on suggestions from the Indiana 
Hospital & Health Association. The survey was then pre-tested for internal validity; changes 
were made to the questionnaire based on responses from pre-test participants. The email survey 
consisted of a cover letter and a hyperlink to the survey. The questionnaire required 
approximately ten minutes to complete; it included 44 questions addressing the Indiana media’s 
understanding of medical adverse events, including the perceived causes and solutions tied to 
these adverse events.  
Participants who did not respond to the email received a second email two weeks later. If 
participants did not respond after an additional week, a researcher contacted the news 
organization by phone to encourage the participant to respond.   
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Variables 
 1) Causes. Previous literature on the causes and solutions of medical adverse events was 
used to create the news media survey. Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of specified 
causes contributing to medical adverse events on a four-point scale from “very important” to 
“not important at all.” A “don’t know” response was provided as well (see Table 1).  
2) Solutions. Solutions were also based on a four-point scale from “very effective” to 




Indiana Health and Medical Providers Focus Groups 
Focus group findings address the first four research questions which dealt with 
perceptions of medical adverse events (i.e., perceptions of the term “medical error” and the 
reporting system in Indiana [RQ1]; opinions about how data should be used and handled [RQ2]; 
perceived barriers to reporting [RQ3]; and solutions to these perceived barriers [RQ4]).  
However, the findings are presented here as themes identified within stakeholder groups (i.e., 
hospital leaders, health providers [nurses and physicians], quality assurance personnel, and 
public relations professionals) (Sections 1-4).  The fifth section identifies themes that were 
common to all stakeholder groups. A final section outlines recommendations relevant to this 






1. Hospital leaders expressed a variety of opinions regarding the term “medical error” and 
what constitutes an adverse medical  event.  
A medical error was seen as human error, something that is an inevitable part of working 
with humans. 
They occur as normal part of the process that involves humans. 
A mistake is sometimes a mistake, and sometimes it has a terrible outcome because 
we deal with humans. 
In addition, medical errors were described as anything that deviated from normal 
operating procedure: 
Well, anytime that an error occurs whether it is a medication error or a 
procedural error, it is any time that you deviate from the normal procedure or 
process. 
A medical error would be anything that didn’t go according to standard 
protocols unless there was stated contraindication to that protocol. 
One participant indicated that near misses were not reportable but should be. 
Indiana should encourage people to report near misses; this information is 
important. 
2. Although the term medical error produced a range of interpretation, there was more 
agreement among hospital leaders on what constitutes an adverse event.  
Several participants commented that there were 27 events that constituted a reportable 
occurrence and some gave examples to illustrate this understanding: 
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Let’s say that you have to give a medication and there was no consequence that 
is not a reportable event, a wrong surgery is a reportable event. But it is has to 
be very major. 
Relative to this piece of legislation, it is [a medical error that is reportable] an 
adverse event that is preventable. 
3. A large number of hospital leaders reported having similar quality assurance measures 
in place prior to the mandate. 
Many participants felt as if they took appropriate corrective action when adverse events 
were discovered. The system’s presence did not necessarily change this process, but may 
challenge some to review their systems. 
It really has not had an impact; I have quality people who were already 
collecting this data. Whenever there is an event we already do a root-cause 
analysis and develop a plan of action to prevent it happening again, so this does 
not change it at all. 
I think that remains to be seen, I think that at the very least this challenges 
providers to review their processes. In the event of an error, we need to take all 
the steps to apply some corrective actions, and so from my perspective, we have 
been doing these things regardless from aside of the actual reporting. We have 
taken all steps to investigate such issues.  
4. In terms of the goals of the medical error reporting system, there was nearly universal 
uncertainty among hospital leaders. 
Many participants responded to the question, “What is your understanding of the 
goals/objectives of the system?” with statements such as “I can’t understand the goals of the 
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system” or “I am not sure of the state’s goals.” Several hospital leaders indicated the desire to 
better understand the system and its fundamental purpose and goals. 
Understanding how they are going to use the information and what is their goal. 
And how are they going to make all hospitals report the information.  
 Don’t make up the rules as you go. I sense this is a great thing but we don’t 
know how we are going to use the information. It just seems that we are making 
up the rules as we go; it is hard for us to abide by the rules this way. People must 
know what the rules are for this to succeed. 
5. Potential goals of the reporting system included public well-being, giving patients better 
control over quality of care, and finding solutions to prevent medical errors. 
 In general, hospital leaders see the system as a way to improve the quality of the 
healthcare. 
My understanding in keeping with the spirit of the governor’s order to work 
towards the improvement of medical care and encourage reporting, and provide 
the opportunity to make the public more educated, and to the extent one can 
learn through sharing. 
I would imagine so because patients can be advocates for their own health. That 
is increasingly becoming important so people can shop around for what is best 
for them. I would hope that is why they did it.  
“It allows the public an accurate way of looking at different facilities so they 
would get quality care.” 
6. Hospital leaders felt the system may not be able to achieve these goals as presently 
constructed.  
 24
Specifically, comments suggested that a goal of “mere reporting” or “public reporting” 
was insufficient to improve patient safety. 
There is nothing here that has anything to do with improving safety. It is just 
reporting events, there is not a method of sharing of solutions so the state would 
be better off, this is a punitive reporting mechanics.   
In the state in Indiana, reporting a list, there is not anything positive about that. 
It tells people that the state is watching. We have very few events. We work on 
them, and we don’t turn around and put them in employee newsletters. This is not 
a positive thing. They may report fewer errors, and the risk of not reporting is 
now greater. It is not a positive thing. 
One comment summarizes the complexity of feeling about medical error reporting: 
You know I have mixed feelings about, and the public can interpret it in a variety 
of ways. They can take away funding, and that’s punitive. That’s a bad thing for 
hospitals; and I totally disagree with that. And if it helps others not to make the 
same mistakes, then you are doing it for the right reasons. You know in health 
care, we did not report things because it was a very punitive environment. We 
spend hours getting employees to tell us about adverse events, it is not because 
they are bad people. You get concerned about people publicly sharing because 
they may get afraid. We have to be careful and go back to not reporting events. 
7. Overall, the system is seen as positive to the extent that it can achieve goals such as 
increasing public well-being, giving patients better control over quality of care, and helping 
to determine solutions to fix the problem of medical errors.  
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Hospital leaders understand the potential of the current reporting system, but they are not 
in agreement about whether the system as currently constructed can achieve its potential. They 
suggest that the state could increase the likelihood of compliance and information-sharing among 
hospitals if they received explanations of how the system’s goals were to be achieved.   
I would think a focus would be more on improvements and action as a direct 
result of the error, and how the facility went on to changing their ways. Don’t 
focus so much on the facility. Make it more of a global concern, realizing we all 
have the capability to have the same result, and to try and make sure that it does 
not happen.  
I would get rid of this system, and create a place to share solutions such a 
Patient Safety Center for improvement, a nonpublic forum so other hospitals 
could share the experience and solutions with events. So we can learn from each 
other. Someone from another hospital could help us with an event. In the current 
system, there is no idea-sharing, and this is a misstep for safety. 
I think that state should use the data; it is not clear how the state is going to use 
that data other than to disseminate it, and how the state will use it. Hopefully, 
that over time it will be able to see improvements. The information should be 
useful in promoting healthcare. I hope it resolves issues. 
I am not opposed to transparency in reporting, I would like to see what can be 
done to improve safety. It is what I care about. I wish they change the current 




Providers (Nurses and Physicians) 
1. Physicians and nurses spoke about errors in terms of their nature and their effects.  
While some participants were vague in conceptualizing medical errors, others used 
specific examples to illustrate.  
It is a deviation of practice with a negative outcome. It can be a result of a 
complication, becoming too familiar with the process, and kind of trusting 
yourself in the process too much. 
There is a wide range of medical adverse events from performing a surgery on 
the wrong site to simply writing a prescription for twice a day instead daily. 
There is also a range of effects of errors from death to no harm to the patient at 
all. 
2. Physicians varied in how they understood the medical errors reporting system in 
Indiana.  
They also suggested the necessity for greater education/information-sharing initiatives. 
I have no understanding of medical error reporting in Indiana. I assume that I 
can report things to hospital administrators, or things come up in litigation, but I 
do not know the ‘official’ medical error reporting system in Indiana. 
I understand there is a hospital medical errors  reporting system, and there were 
discussion about the possible impact on medical liability. However, I do not 
know how the information is reported or who is responsible. 
3. Although nurses seemed more knowledgeable about the system than did physicians, 
nurses tended to talk more about their own reporting procedures.  
 This indicated a range of perceptions across hospitals and providers.  
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[There are] 27 reportable events…I think they are very standard based on the 
National Quality Forum and the mandatory reporting is public next year. All the 
nurses need to know who to contact and who to report to. I think they are 
realizing that they still need to identify one of those events, and then you have a 
time frame 15 days to report them. 
Now with the data declaring this, that data can be shared so other places can 
learn from it. 
In our facility which is a small facility, the investigation even before goes to 
quality, and the supervisor, and I mean they do not have to big items, and the 
items is ranked as far as severity. That is all part of our protocol as far as what 
gets disclosed, and it has to be a certain level of severity of error before it is 
disclosed and if it reaches the degree where management may need to be called 
in. 
4. Both physicians and nurses were nervous about the public reporting of medical errors.  
They were concerned that people might not choose a particular facility because of how 
the information is presented by the media, and that the public may not be medically literate 
enough to correctly interpret the information. 
I think having a policy that is open to the public is different, that may make 
people not choose that hospital or that facility, so I am little nervous about how it 
is going to be perceived by the public. If the public is going to the web site and 
they make use of it, they can make decisions about not using a facility. So it is 
going to affect us negatively, I think we need to know how to handle it. The 
public may not perceive it the same way as us. 
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And that’s the piece that I would be concerned about would be the negative 
attention from consumers, how they would take that information, and how they 
use that. I even hate to say this, but how marketing might go in and look at that 
or might say something. What would a human do? It’s normal human behavior to 
look at people who aren’t up to that bar. And are not performing to where the 
expectations are. 
I would like to see it anonymous and confidential. I’m not sure the general public 
is medically literate enough to truly understand how to interpret the data. 
5. Both physicians and nurses stressed the importance and necessity of confidentiality in 
reporting. 
I hope that it is compiled and presented as aggregate information example ‘there 
were “x” number of medication dispensing errors in central Indiana’ to the 
public, then confidentially communicated from the state to doctors and hospitals 
when appropriate. 
“It should be used publicly in a de-identified fashion. A reporting system should 
be used to highlight best- and worst- practices. By making the information 
available in a de-identified fashion, you will overcome concerns about liability 
and defensiveness.” 
6. A main theme of the nurse’s responses was the need for positive information and 
educational programs that highlight the positive aspects of safety initiatives.  
Although some mentioned benchmarking as a potential positive of the system, it was not 
seen as entirely positive as was the educational potential. 
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“Other things I like about the reporting system are that there is ongoing 
education. You will able to see what they have done, and you can see recall 
analysis and how they done things. If you are looking at things, and then you can 
see what you have done even there are near misses or an error, you can in there 
and see what others have done or see the processes they have done and hopefully 
prevent an error from happening.” 
“Information should be provided in a “positive” fashion in addition to only 
reporting errors. Just as good business managers and parents offer positive and 
negative feedback for behaviors they wish to reinforce, a “medical adverse 
events” system in Indiana should set forth practice models as well as identifying 
problems. It is hard to identify individual areas for outcomes.” 
“While perhaps practical, errors happen in every aspect of medical practice due 
to the inherent complexities of the system.” 
 
Quality Assurance Professionals 
1. Quality assurance professionals pointed out the ambiguity of the term “medical errors.”  
Uncertainty centered on the scope of medical errors as well as the continual shifts and 
debates in the ways in which medical errors are defined. 
There are many definitions of medical errors. For health care unity, we need to 
determine what a medical error is. 
The concept of medical errors is constantly expanding and changing. If you don’t 
provide all the details about the evidence-based standard care, is that an error?  
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When you look at as harm to the patient, that’s open to debate. It’s difficult to 
come up with an operational definition. 
2. Gaps in the understanding of medical errors are a system-level problem versus an 
individual-level problem.  
Specifically, quality assurance professionals commented that their attempts to look at the 
whole system or the reporting process is interpreted by health care providers as “blaming the 
individual.” Likewise, media and the public typically use individual-level explanations.  
I think we really try to focus on the system, we look at our processes…I am not 
sure if the public is there yet. Media in my environment is more of a punitive 
approach – a negative story. 
 But there is a big section of health care that doesn’t look at it as a process. And 
most of the time we will find it as a process trouble. You can’t blame yourself. 
But usually in health care system it’s seen as personal responsibility.  
None of us go to work with the intention of harming anyone. It’s not an 
individual goal. That’s the message that needs to go out. We all are working here 
and gone through umpteen years of education to get to this point. 
“It has to be accepted that human beings make errors. That’s the first step. 
Another step is what we are putting in place so human beings do not cause much 
harm to patients. It’s not intended to harm anyone.” 
3. Quality assurance professionals suggest that medical errors reporting is about protecting 
the patient and optimizing the services available to the patient. 
 Our job is how we can address those errors from being harmful to patients. 
4. There was concern regarding the media’s role in sensationalizing medical errors.  
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Participants perceived stories that focus on conflict as more valuable to the news media 
than good ones.  
Nothing is worse for the media than to have a slow news day. So they will love 
this because it gives them something for that week. And it’s done under the guise 
of public service. I don’t know whether they have that much of an investment in 
the game. For them it’s like a great story to tell. 
5. Participants discussed the necessity for opening up communication systems in hospitals.  
Quality assurance professionals believe that visibility will reduce negative perceptions. 
Transparency involves communication with patients and media, as well as other hospitals to 
learn about system-level issues and to fix them.  
It’s also true that we have built walls around our institutions and have not let 
anybody in. So people want to see how these things work because once you walk 
through our door you are under our control. We tell you when to eat, when to go 
to the bathroom, all these things. And we haven’t let anybody see that. If you 
think you are getting a glimpse, it’s a huge thing. Whether it’s appropriate or the 
most helpful thing doesn’t enter into it. 
If we are not sharing our root cause analysis, we are not learning. We can learn 
from each other’s events. 
6. There is a need to promote the reporting of events by sharing past, present and future 
successes with the public and other medical institutions.  
Specifically, quality assurance professionals commented that medical error reporting 
initiatives have been in hospitals for years.   
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These things are going on for years. But we haven’t ignored these. Every single 
event – review, internal investigation – and when I talk to my neighbors about 
what we do, they would say, I had no idea that your hospital is like this.’  
“Train the public that errors are going to happen. But we are constantly working 
to ensure that they don’t happen. 
As a quality professional, when we go into to investigate an event, we come from that 
process vs. people part. But the practitioners that are involved immediately take on that 
line. One of the first things we do is put the blame away and say let’s look at this. We are 
talking about health care as a process. But there is a big section of health care that 
doesn’t look at it as a process 
 
Public Relations Personnel 
1. Some public relations professionals saw medical errors as an individual-level problem 
committed by individual staff members.  
I think we all see it as medical errors by some members of the hospital staff. 
Something was done that was not the right thing. A device or person did 
something that wasn’t right to the patient. 
2. Some public relations professionals saw medical errors as related to system-level 
characteristics. 
Medical errors can occur as a result of a variety of circumstances such as 
inexperienced nurses and doctors, new unproven procedures, poor 
communication, improper documentation, illegible handwriting and staffing 
issues (to name a few causes).  In most cases, medical errors are not a result of 
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one person’s mistake but a system-wide issue that failed to prevent the error from 
occurring. 
3. The orientation is crisis-response, rather than preventive, although the system 
encourages a proactive attitude.  
Our Quality Management department has been preparing for the new regulation 
since it was first announced. We have taken a very proactive approach to the new 
rules. We try to be as transparent as possible so the news rules certainly fall into 
line with our philosophy on releasing information to the public. 
I guess our role would be…when our quality officer and/or the CEO tell us, we 
need to let people know, we need to be prepared for getting calls from the press. 
If we get calls from the press, I doubt we will address the issues. We have not 
determined yet who will be the spokesperson. It could be the chief quality officer. 
4. The general role of the public relations professional is to communicate with public 
through the media.  
Thus, the PR practitioner does not deal with error reporting or the system as much as with 
routing media representatives to the appropriate spokesperson or offering wording expertise for 
information that will go out to the media or public. 
 For reporting to the public, it will go through me. But I will not necessarily know what 
we are reporting to the state department. The quality officer does that. For media, I do it 
usually. But however, depending on what they ask, I pass on to the CEO or whoever we 
determine to be the spokesperson. I probably won’t discuss the details with the media 
though I would be aware of what they are talking about. 
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5. According to PR practitioners, the error reporting system in Indiana aims to improve 
patient care and increase accountability. 
This response is similar to hospital leaders.  
[The system] is clearly intended to help improve patient safety initiatives and to 
help patients evaluate the care given at hospitals and other healthcare facilities.  
It seems that the goals and objectives of this new order are to help improve 
public accountability. 
6. Participants commented about the necessity for confidentiality, standardization, and 
movement away from a punitive culture and toward an incentivized system.  
With regard to confidentiality, concerns were expressed over the reporting of errors to 
the general public. Instead, it was suggested that error reporting information be used only to 
share information among healthcare organizations to improve the system. 
Let’s just not report this to the public, but let’s use this information in a 
confidential forum between health systems and hospitals. 
If the goal is to reduce errors by reporting, then I don’t think that’s adequate. 
You can argue that public has a right to know and these should be released. But I 
think some of the confidential forums between hospitals will be more effective in 
reducing the number. But I think institutions need to have the processes in place. 
My biggest concern is the data will be used just to compare hospital to hospital 
and rank which hospital had the most and which had the least. 
With regard to standardization, respondents commented that reporting may differ from 
state to state, hospital to hospital.  
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Even in the information that Indiana hospital association sends out, there are 
nuances and differences and how people will report. This also shows it’s not just 
health system but state associations are saying this. It might not be apple to 
apple. 
I think it [my main concern] would be consistency in reporting of errors. I would 
like to know that process is working well. That all institutions are reporting and 
in the same way. 
There is no system to check if people are reporting. You are trusted to do the 
right thing and report. 
As with the hospital leaders, PR practitioners saw the system as potentially punitive. It 
was suggested that some sort of incentive be instituted to help alleviate this perception. 
It does not sound very non punitive. 
I think our quality officer is preparing us get away from the punitive culture and 
improving the process. 
The system the way its set up right now is not necessarily punitive, but certainly 
not incentivized. I think there’s no penalty in place for not reporting such event. 
We agree that the reporting has to happen. We would like to see that there’s 
more incentivized plan. 
7. PR practitioners stressed the utility of the system in promoting learning from mistakes.   
It should not be like that [a reporting system strictly for release to the public] for 
the sake of reporting, but for educating one another. 
…all hospitals have a deep understanding that errors do occur and it critical we 
learn from every event that does happen so it can be prevented in the future. 
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Overall Focus Group Themes 
1. Although many participants understood medical adverse events to be system-based, 
there is a slight misconception that errors are a product of individual-level errors.  
Moreover, there is a high level of ambiguity with regard to both “medical errors” and 
“medical adverse events” as the terms were not consistently defined or expanded upon across 
groups. There is greater need for consistency in defining terms and communication that is 
consistent.  
2. Participants from all groups stressed the need for the reporting system to provide 
education and not be used as a punitive measure.  
If the system is perceived as a punitive measure then participants will not view it as a 
potentially important part of creating a no-blame and safety-centered culture. In this regard, the 
participants across the groups pointed out the importance of education and information 
campaigns that highlight the system-level nature of the issue.  
3. There was almost universal agreement regarding the potential for the system to educate 
healthcare providers and leaders about errors and potential misses.  
Participants continually stressed that learning from mistakes and “almost errors” would 
be beneficial. Instituting a system that will allow for information sharing that is used as 
educational is wanted. 
4. There is a large amount of anxiety over the potential of public reporting among all 
constituent groups.  
Although anxieties are idiosyncratic insofar as they have different potential impact on 
different occupations, participants were generally concerned with the media focusing on the 
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negative aspects of medical adverse events and the lack of standardization being misrepresented 
in the news media.   
5. Most hospitals already have reporting systems in place.  
The current system may be seen as negative because (a) it is mandatory and (b) it is 
perceived as less useful or more punitive than current systems.  
6. There were several comments regarding the use of explanation within the reporting 
system.  
Specifically, many suggested that instead of simply reporting the number of events that a 
description be included in order for learning opportunities to be available.  
 
Indiana News Media Survey 
Understandings of Medical Errors (RQ 5) 
The majority (77%) of Indiana journalists responded that they had heard the term 
“medical error” before, and they view a medical error as a mistake or misdiagnosis that occurred 
under the care of a hospital, employee, doctor or facility which can either risk the life of or injure 
a patient. Most journalists learned about the issue of medical errors from the news media (48%) 
or experience with a friend or a family member (21%).  
 Most journalists believed that preventable adverse events occur “somewhat often” (39%) 
or “not too often” (39%). They overwhelmingly (65%) believed that both individuals and the 
health care system can be responsible for a medical error. However, most journalists felt that 
they do not know (52%) how many Americans are affected annually, but they would speculate 
that around 5,000 people are affected annually by medical errors in the United States. Answers 
varied regarding the number of preventable medical errors: all (14%), three-quarters (25%), half 
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(31%), one-quarter (2%), and “don’t know” (29%). The majority of journalists (98%) believe 
that reporting medical errors data should be required and (66%) released to the public.  
 
Perceived Causes of Medical Errors (RQ 6) 
News media professionals in Indiana responded that there are multiple contributing 
factors to medical errors.  These include communication barriers (76%), heavy patient loads 
(74%), overwork/stress or fatigue of providers (56%), and too few nurses (44%).  They indicated 
that  poor training of health professionals (18%), increase use of computerized medical records 
(18%) and fragmented nature of health facilities (20%) are less likely the cause of medical errors 
(see Table 1). 
 
Effectiveness of Solutions (RQ 7) 
The majority of journalists responded that more support is needed for individual health 
care providers to prevent adverse events. News media professionals indicated that “very 
effective” solutions to preventing medical errors include requiring hospitals to implement 
systems to avoid medical errors (86%), record corrective and preventive procedures (80%), allow 
more time with patients (68%), increase the number of nurses (52%), and reduce the number of 





Indiana Health and Medical Providers 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that medical errors are not often disclosed, despite the fact 
that patients, physicians and the public support disclosure (Blendon,et al., 2002; Mazor et al., 
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2004). This may be due to minimal disclosure guidelines for practitioners (Mazor, Simon & 
Gurwitz, 2004; Rosenthal & Riley, 2001). Results from this study’s focus groups may be used to 
help guide disclosure in such a way that ensures patient safety.  
 Health and medical providers voiced the opinion that medical providers should be 
encouraged to share and learn from one another to prevent medical errors. Based upon providers’ 
responses, the researchers make the following recommendations.  
1. Education and continual communication that clearly addresses the goals and expected 
benefits of medical error reporting should be provided by the state.  
This information is essential to overcome skepticism about the system’s purpose. The 
format, presentation style, and message strategy should be tailored for multiple audiences to 
optimize effectiveness.  Health care professionals would like to see information on the error, the 
prescriptive practices used to correct it, and evidence-based changes occurring from their 
reporting of medical adverse events.  
Some efficient approaches to communicating with medical and health providers can be 
accomplished on a Web site. The ISDH could create modules for providers, such as: 1) an online 
introductory module that lays out the objectives and goals of the system, supported with in-
person contact at administrative, staff, and provider meetings, 2) monthly reports showing 
incident-sharing prescriptive practices, 3) an annual or biannual report that documents evidence-
based outcomes, 4) and news releases sent to key liaisons working in Indiana medical institutions 





2. Work to standardize the reporting system across the state.  
Standardization is an important element necessary to make this program effective across 
the state of Indiana. Health care providers want to work together but fear that the lack of a 
standardized system in place will be a barrier to the system.  
3. Reflect a no-blame culture and a commitment to protect patient safety in all public 
communication.  
There is a need to shift the individual-blame model to a system-based model whereby 
medical errors and adverse events are defined as a process issue. This is delicate, however, 
because statements could cause more fear than calm among the public, even if the “blame” is 
shifted from individuals to process.  Statements should highlight the commitment of hospitals 
and their staff to protect patient safety in every feasible way.  
4. Help hospitals provide a consistent message regarding medical errors to reduce 
confusion and fear among the public.   
The ISDH could create media templates to assist medical organizations in responding to 
medical errors. They may also consider providing PR assistance for media and hospital 
professionals through a statewide public relations contact.  
 
Indiana News Media 
 News media play a key role in molding public perception about medical errors, and many 
health care organizations look to the media to communicate with the public on their behalf. Good 
relationships between the media, health care organizations, and the state are vital to achieve 
state-wide patient safety improvement and education.   
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1.  Make the process and procedures of the medical errors reporting system transparent to 
the media, and establish a communication sharing system before the release of the first 
annual report.    
Responses from the email survey indicate that the majority of the news media believes 
that medical errors should be reported to the state, and errors and corrective practices should be 
shared with the public. Knowledge of a state-wide communication-sharing system will 
encourage the news media to focus less on numbers and more on how the state is working to 
ensure safer medical environments, which will be particularly important to members of the 
public who have been affected by a medical error (Peters, Lipkus, & Diefenbach, 2006). 
2. Provide extensive background information on medical errors and the medical errors 
regulation on a continual basis.   
This could include the availability of a Web site that provides in-depth information.  
3. Inform hospitals that they need to designate a public relations and a medical professional 
to be available to speak to the public and the news media about medical errors.   
4. Educate the news media about how medical professionals take action once a medical 
error has occurred. 
5. Educate the media on how to help the public use the data to make informed health care 
decisions.  
6. Offer a one day or evening session dedicated to educating reporters about the issue of 
medical errors and the reporting system in Indiana.  
The survey data shows that most reporters (86%) are general assignment reporters, 
editors, or news directors, which means that they do not regularly cover health or medical issues.  
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VII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This research project sought to identify health provider and media perceptions and their 
recommendations related to reporting adverse events data. In order to maximize the effectiveness 
of the data resulting from the new policy, we encourage the ISDH to: 
• Develop education modules for key stakeholders to provide information on the 
background and the benefits of reporting adverse events. 
• Offer data in tailored formats for various stakeholders. 
• Develop communication tools that health care organizations can use with the 
public and local media. 
• Offer training for the news media to facilitate their reporting of the data. 
• Provide supporting materials with the release of the data that target how data will 
be used to prevent future occurrences of medical adverse events. 
• Provide resources for the news media, the public, and the providers that detail 
background information on adverse events and the adverse events regulation.    
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VIII. ENDNOTES 
1 Those states are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wyoming 
 
2 The 27 events include:  
1) surgery performed on the wrong body part,  
2) surgery performed on the wrong patient,  
3) wrong surgical procedure performed on a patient,  
4) retention of foreign object in a patient after surgery or other procedure,  
5) intraoperative or immediately post-operative death,  
6) patient death or serious disability associated with the use of contaminated drugs, devices or 
biologics by the health care facility,  
7) patient death or serious disability associated with the use or function of a device in patient 
care in which the device is used or functions other than as intended,  
8) patient death or serious disability associated with intravascular air embolism that occurs while 
being cared for in a health care facility,  
9) infant discharged to the wrong person,  
10) patient death or serious disability associated with patient elopement for more than four hours,  
11) patient suicide, or attempted suicide, resulting in serious disability while being cared for in a 
health care facility,  
12) patient death or serious disability associated with a medication error,  
13) patient death or serious disability associated with a hemolytic reaction due to the 
administration of incompatible blood or blood products,  
14) maternal death or serious disability associated with labor or delivery in a low-risk pregnancy 
while being care for in a health care facility,  
15) patient death or serious disability associated with hypoglycemia, the onset of which occurs 
while the patient is being care for in a health care facility,  
16) death or serious disability associated with failure to identify and treat hyperbilirubinimia in 
neonates,  
17) stage 3 or 4 pressure ulcers acquired after admission to a health care facility,  
18) patient death or serious disability due to spinal manipulative therapy,  
19) patient death or serious disability associated with an electronic shock while being care for in 
a health care facility,  
20) any incident in which a line designated for oxygen or other gas to be delivered to a patient 
contains the wrong gas or is contaminated by toxic substances,  
21) patient death or serious disability associated with a burn incurred from any source while 
being care for in a health care facility,  
22) patient death associated with a fall while being care for in a health care facility,  
23) patient death or serious disability associated with the use of restraints or bedrails while being 
in a health care facility,  
24) any instance of care ordered by or provided by someone impersonating a physician, nurse, 
pharmacist or other licensed health care provider,  
25) abduction of a patient at any age,  
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26) sexual assault on a patient within or on the grounds of a health care facility and  
27) death or significant injury of a patient or staff member resulting from a physical assault that 
occurs within or on the grounds of a health care facility  
 
3 The QuIC included the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, 
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Table 1:  Perceived Causes of Medical Errors by Indiana News Media Journalists 












Miscommunication or no 
communication among 
hospital workers 76%  16%  4%  2% 2%  
Heavy patient load 74% 20% 4% 0% 2% 
Overwork, stress and 
fatigue of providers 56% 38% 4% 2% 0% 
Too few nurses 44% 38% 8% 4% 6% 
HMO network providers 
effect on treatment 
decisions 38% 46% 8% 4% 4% 
Failures of the medical 
system  34% 44% 6% 10% 6% 
Poor handwriting of 
providers 34% 42% 10% 10% 4% 
Fragmented nature of 
health care facilities 20% 46% 10% 6% 18% 
Lack of computerized 
medical records 18% 44% 26% 10% 2% 
Poor training of 











Table 2:  Perceived Solutions to Medical Errors by Indiana News Media Journalists 











Make medical error  
reporting mandatory 88% 10% 2% 0% 0% 
Implement systems to 
avoid medical errors 86% 14% 0% 0% 0% 
Record corrective and 
preventative procedures 80% 18% 0% 0% 2% 
Report errors to a state 
agency 78% 20% 0% 2% 0% 
Share corrective and 
preventative practices 72% 18% 2% 6% 2% 
Make medical errors 
public 72% 14% 6% 4% 4% 
Spend more time with 
patients 68% 26% 0% 2% 4% 
Have a state agency use 
the data to find solutions 60% 30% 6% 4% 0% 
Reduce the number of 
works to alleviate fatigue 52% 40% 4% 4% 0% 
Increase nursing 
numbers 52% 32% 8% 2% 6% 
Greater use of 
computerizes records 40% 46% 8% 6% 0% 
Fine/suspend the license 
of those who  cause a 
medical error  34% 50% 14% 0% 2% 
Rely on specialists more 
so than primary care 
doctors 20% 44% 22% 10% 4% 
Include a pharmacist on 
hospital rounds 16%  52% 12% 6% 14% 
More lawsuits for 
malpractice 4% 14% 40% 40% 2% 
 
